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1

I love retaliation; it’s in the Bible and people get it.
I. INTRODUCTION

Like the pigs’ description of the animals in Orwell’s Animal
2
Farm, all employment discrimination laws are equal, but some
employment discrimination laws are more equal than others. While
it is unlawful for sex, race, color, national origin, and religion to even
motivate employment decisions, after the Supreme Court’s 2013
3
decision in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,
4
retaliation, age, and, in all likelihood, disability may sometimes
5
lawfully motivate employer conduct. In other words, while some
level of employer discrimination based on age, disability, or
retaliation is tolerated, no amount of employer discrimination based
on the five other statutory protected classes is permitted. Despite
nearly identical statutory language, the Court has held that the
protected classes must be litigated under different standards of
6
proof.
Nassar held that an employee-plaintiff alleging that he
suffered adverse employment action as a form of retaliation must
prove his case according to traditional principles of “but for”
causation, not the more easily established causation test stated in
7
Title VII.
Perhaps not surprisingly, within weeks of the Nassar holding, a
bipartisan group of law-makers re-introduced parallel bills in the U.S.
House of Representatives and the Senate, called the Protecting Older
8
Workers against Discrimination Act (POWADA).
POWADA,
originally proposed in 2009 after the Supreme Court held that an
9
employee’s age could motivate employer conduct, would expand the

1

Wayne Outten, Managing Partner, Outten & Golden, LLP, Remarks at New
nd
York University’s 62 Annual Conference on Labor and Employment Law Initiatives
and Proposals in the Obama Administration (June 5, 2009).
2
GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 133 (Signet Classic 1996) (1946) (“There was
nothing there now except a single Commandment. It ran: ‘ALL ANIMALS ARE
EQUAL BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS.’”).
3
133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
4
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009).
5
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2532–33.
6
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(m) (2011); Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2012).
7
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(m) (2011).
8
H.R. 2852, 113th. Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
9
Gross, 557 U.S. at 180.
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so-called mixed-motive jury instruction to age, retaliation, and
disability, and would allow plaintiffs, not judges, to decide which
10
types of instruction the jury would receive.
While POWADA’s sponsors and the Court have staked out very
11
different views on this issue, Congress and the Court seem to equally
lack helpful data to inform their respective opinions. The lack of
data informing opinions is ironic, but unfortunately typical,
considering that Nassar and POWADA are both attempting to inform
areas noted for their stark absence of data germane to the interaction
12
of legal rules in the employment discrimination context.
Consequently, regardless of whether Congress abrogates Nassar (and
perhaps Gross), POWADA will remain flawed because either age and
disability will be treated differently than other protected classes, or
retaliation law will be so employee-friendly that employers will
overcompensate in instances in which an employee complains about
any type of unlawful conduct. POWADA could make a bit more
sense, however, if both Congress and the courts took relevant
experimental social science evidence and its interaction with legal
doctrine more seriously.
More nuanced attention to burden of proof allocations is one
important way to improve employment discrimination law. Presently,
two types of jury instructions are available: (1) the “pretext,” or “butfor” instruction; and (2) the “mixed-motive” or “motivating-factor”
13
instruction.
These two jury instructions apply to at least three
employment discrimination statutes: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
10

Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721, 111th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2009).
11
See Press Release, Tom Harkin, U.S. Senator, Bipartisan Senate Legislation
Seeks to Protect Older Workers from Discrimination (July 30, 2013), available at
http://www.harkin.senate.gov/press/release.cfm?i=345436 (“The Supreme Court’s
divisive holding in Gross has created uncertainty in our civil rights laws, making it
incumbent on Congress to clarify our intent.” (quoting Patrick Leahy, U.S.
Senator)).
12
The Federal Workforce: Observations on Protections From Discrimination
and Reprisal for Whistleblowing, (May 9, 2001), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-01715T/html/GAOREPORTS-GAO-01-715T.htm (“Currently, because of the lack of
data, the federal government lacks a clear picture of the volume of discrimination
and whistleblowing reprisal cases involving federal employees.”); Carolyn Shaw Bell,
Comparable worth: how do we know it will work?, The Monthly Labor Review, 5, 5 (Dec.
1985), http://blsweb1.psb.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1985/12/art2full.pdf (noting the
“dearth of useful data” in related to employment discrimination).
13
See generally David Sherwyn & Michael Heise, The Gross Beast of Burden of Proof:
Experimental Evidence on How the Burden of Proof Influences Employment Discrimination
Case Outcomes, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 901, 905–15 (2010).

SHERWYN HEISE (DO NOT DELETE)

4/2/2014 12:11 PM

458

[Vol. 44:455

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
14

of 1964 (Title VII), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
15
16
(ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Each of
the statutes prohibits retaliation against those who oppose
discrimination based on any of the relevant protected classes, and
those who participate in a government investigation (e.g., by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or a state or municipal
17
agency) or in discrimination litigation.
The mixed-motive jury instruction arose out of the Supreme
18
Court’s Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins decision. The Civil Rights Act of
1991 codified the mixed-motive jury instruction, made it significantly
more plaintiff-friendly, and, for all intents and purposes, expanded its
use so that mixed motive is now a misnomer and should be called
19
“motivating-factor” instruction.
Two subsequent Supreme Court
cases, Gross and Nassar, held that the motivating-factor instruction
20
21
does not apply to age or retaliation cases. After Gross and Nassar,
then, there is no legal basis to apply the motivating-factor instruction
to ADA cases. After all, it would make little sense for the Court to
infer a “motivating-factor” instruction into the ADA after failing to do
so for age and retaliation. The ADA is similar to both retaliation and
ADEA in that none of three laws specially allow for the motivating
factor instruction (Congress did not amend the ADEA, did not
address retaliation, and the ADA went into effect after the CRA of
1991) and all use the term “because of.” Thus, as of the writing of
this Article, an employer motivated by race, color, sex, national
origin, or religion, but who would have made the decision regardless
of the protected class, is liable for discrimination and associated
22
attorneys’ fees and costs. Alternatively, an employer motivated by
age, disability, or retaliation, but who would have made the decision
14

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2008) (protecting against
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
15
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2012)
(protecting people over forty).
16
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2011) (protecting
people with disabilities).
17
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
18
490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
19
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, § 2 (1991)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2008)) (“[T]he decision of the Supreme
Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (2011) has weakened the
scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections . . . .”).
20
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009).
21
Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2532–33 (2013).
22
See Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13, at 930.
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anyway is not liable for discrimination nor associated costs and fees.
POWADA directly implicates the motivating-factor jury
instruction by extending it to include age, disability, and retaliation.
As explained below, the Supreme Court’s Gross and Nassar decisions
pivot on a statutory construction approach that makes sense in a
vacuum, but makes far less sense in the context of Price Waterhouse
and the history of employment discrimination laws. The Gross
decision is further undermined because there is little support for
23
distinguishing age, or disability for that matter, from Title VII. The
nature of retaliation claims within the context of actual employment
discrimination litigation, however, fundamentally differs from claims
moored in other protected classes. As well, these claims differ in a
manner that will unduly tilt jurors in a direction favorable to
employee assertions of employer retaliation. Consequently, we argue
that POWADA’s desire to extend the motivating-factor jury
instruction to include employer retaliation claims is misguided as it
ignores important differences that distinguish retaliation claims from
other employer discrimination claims.
To test our claim we replicated and slightly modified a prior jury
24
experiment by substituting a retaliation claim for a national origin
employment discrimination claim in an otherwise constant
employment discrimination fact pattern. Just over 40 percent of the
mock jurors in the earlier study (2010) were persuaded by an
employee’s claim that national origin motivated an employer’s
25
adverse action. In the instant experiment, almost 60 percent of the
mock jurors were persuaded by a retaliation claim holding constant
26
the other salient parts of the fact pattern from the prior study.
Simply altering the nature of the employment discrimination claims
(national origin versus retaliation) likely explains at least some of the
observed increased likelihood of jurors concluding that the
complaining employee successfully established a viable legal claim. If
this is so, then extending mixed-motive jury instructions to include
retaliation claims, as contemplated by POWADA, is unlikely to resolve
23

See generally Lawrence D. Rosenthal, A Lack of “Motivation,” or Sound Legal
Reasoning? Why Most Courts Are Not Applying Either Price Waterhouse’s or the 1991 Civil
Rights Act’s Motivating-Factor Analysis to Title VII Retaliation Claims in a Post-Gross World
(But Should), 64 ALA. L. REV. 1067 (2013). At least one scholar, Lex K. Larson,
concluded that the motivating-factor jury instruction does apply to retaliation claims.
Id. at 1111–12 & n.85, 376–82.
24
See Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13, at 926–47.
25
Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13, at 937 Table 5.
26
See infra Part IV.
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key problems challenging employment law doctrine and, worse still,
may exacerbate other problems.
Part II includes a brief history of the “but for” and “motivating
factor” burden of proof schemes that dominate employment
discrimination litigation. Part III discusses the law of employer
retaliation and argues why retaliation is fundamentally different from
other protected employee classes. Part IV presents results from our
jury study in which we seek to experimentally assess the consequences
of applying the motivating-factor jury instruction in the employer
retaliation context. Finally, Part V discusses a possible solution for
the burden of proof conundrum as well as avenues for further
productive empirical research in this area.
II. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISCRIMINATION CASES UNDER TITLE VII
AND THE ADEA
More comprehensive accounts of the “but for” and “motivating
factor” schemes’ development can be found in other law review
27
28
articles, including one by two of the authors.
The abbreviated
summary that follows seeks only to frame the main argument of this
Article.
Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA each expressly state that
employers may not discriminate because of the certain employee
29
characteristics protected by the statutes. These statutes do not go
on to explain, however, how parties prove their case, which party
bears the burden of proof, or how much, if any, employer
discrimination is tolerated. Thus, the courts developed the methods,
burdens, and standards of proof in a series of Supreme Court and
30
lower-court decisions, modified by Congress in the Civil Rights Act

27

See, e.g., Michael C. Harper, The Causation Standard in Federal Employment Law:
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled Promise of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 69, 75–111 (2010). See Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in
Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER
L. REV. 651 (2000), for a discussion of the evolution of the “motivating factor”
framework.
28
See generally Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13.
29
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2008); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §
12112 (2011).
30
See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 909–915 & n.57
(1973); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc, 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000); St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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31

of 1991, and then subsequently refined by Desert Palace, Inc. v Costa,
32
Gross, Nassar, and a host of lower court decisions. To understand
the current state of the burden of proof assignment, it is necessary to
understand its evolution, beginning with the Court’s holding in
33
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.
A. A Brief History
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court established the method of proof
in discrimination cases. The Court held that to prove discrimination,
employees first had to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
To prove a prima facie case, employees had to establish that: (1) they
belonged to a protected class; (2) they were minimally qualified for
the position in question and that they applied for the position; (3)
they suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the job
34
remained open.
The fourth element was fact-specific to the
McDonnell Douglas case as it was a “failure to hire” case and the
35
allegations occurred before the company filled the position. Thus,
the Court’s framework focused on the fact that the company
continued to look for employees after rejecting the plaintiff and
36
made that the fourth element.
Over the years, courts have
expanded the fourth element to address situations where a company
hired (or fired) an employee other than the plaintiff. In such cases,
the fourth element is either: (1) the job went to an employee outside
37
the plaintiff’s protected class, or (2) in a discharge case, that
31

539 U.S. 90 (2003).
For cases pre-Costa, see Stella v. Minetta, 284 F.3d 135, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(holding that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to establish that she was replaced by a
person outside of her protected class to satisfy the burden under McDonnell Douglas);
Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
prima facie case may exist even if one white worker is replaced by another white
worker); Hong v. Children’s Mem’l Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding that Title VII plaintiff must show satisfactory work at the time of discharge
to state a prima facie case); Johnson v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 994 F.2d 543, 546 (8th
Cir. 1992) (holding that ADEA plaintiff must show satisfactory work at the time of
discharge to state a prima facie case).
33
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
34
Id. at 802 (“This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.”).
35
Id. at 801–02 & n.13.
36
Id.
37
See, e.g., Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 918–19 (8th Cir. 2000)
(reversing the district court’s entry of summary judgment for the employer where the
32
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similarly situated employees outside the protected class engaged in
38
similar conduct, but were treated differently.
The establishment of a prima facie case creates a rebuttable
39
presumption that the employer discriminated.
Employers may
refute this presumption by “producing (not proving)” a legitimate,
40
non-discriminatory reason for the decision.
After an employer
satisfies this very low burden, the employee can, in turn, prove
discrimination by establishing that the real reason for the decision
was discrimination or that the reason articulated by the employer was
41
pretextual, and hence, unworthy of belief.
The framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas was refined by
42
several subsequent decisions.
In Texas Department of Community
43
Affairs v. Burdine, the Court of Appeals explicitly held that the
employer had to prove that: (1) the articulated reason was the real
reason for the decision; and (2) the person hired was more qualified
44
than the plaintiff. The Supreme Court rejected this expanded, or
inaccurate, interpretation of McDonnell Douglas and reiterated that:
(1) the employer need only articulate a non-discriminatory reason
45
and; (2) there was no obligation to hire the best candidate for a job.
46
Instead, the employer simply could not discriminate.
For some
reason, courts and employment professionals use the term
47
Such language is
“legitimate non-discriminatory reason.”
redundant, however, because a reason is legitimate if it is non-

plaintiff was a member of an age protected group and was replaced by younger
individuals.); Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 905 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that
plaintiff did not make out his prima facie case as he was replaced by another male).
38
See Silvera v. Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (“In
determining whether employees are similarly situated for purposes of establishing a
prima facie case, it is necessary to consider whether the employees are involved in or
accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different way.”)
(quoting Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir.
1998). Furthermore, the courts recognized that some employees may not apply for
the jobs and thus, prong two was modified as well.
39
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 804–07.
42
See generally Tex. Dep’t Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
43
450 U.S. at 251–52.
44
Id. at 256–59.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 257.
47
See, e.g., id. at 252.
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discriminatory. Thus, firing employees because of the color of their
shirts, their favorite sports teams, or their taste in music is nondiscriminatory and legitimate even if such characteristics have no
effect on the employees’ ability to do their jobs. Employers who
engage in such decision making are human resource professionals’
worst nightmares and provide opportunities for union organizers, but
48
are squarely within the law.
In 1989, the Supreme Court confronted another type of
employment discrimination—the so-called mixed-motive case. In
49
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the firm denied Ann Hopkins a
promotion to partnership on two separate occasions, despite her
excellent job performance, because of her allegedly poor
50
interpersonal skills. After the initial decision, some of the firm’s
partners counseled Hopkins that in order to improve her chances of
being promoted, she should wear makeup, get her hair done, stop
51
cursing, and walk, talk, and act in a more “feminine” manner.
Hopkins argued that these statements were evidence of sexual
discrimination and that this evidence, along with her strong
performance, proved that the denial of partnership was unlawful.
The employer conceded that the plaintiff’s performance was strong,
but that the firm would not promote Hopkins, regardless of her skills
because of her poor interpersonal skills and because she was difficult
52
to get along with
The Court found that the employer had both legitimate (the
interpersonal skills) and illegitimate (sex-based discriminatory
53
standards applied only to female associates) reasons for its conduct.
The Price Waterhouse Court made it seem like this was a unique

48

Employment at-will is the standard in almost all states and thus, employers
have the right to hire and fire whomever they wish for any reasons they want as long
as the reasons do not violate specific laws. Thus, a reason that is non-discriminatory
is legitimate even if illogical, unfair, and / or seemingly absurd.
49
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
50
Id. at 231–36.
51
Id. at 235.
52
Id. at 231–36. Many partners simply did not get along with Hopkins and
stated that “[s]he tended to alienate the staff in that she was extremely overbearing.
Ann needs improvement in her interpersonal skills.” Cynthia Estlund, The Story of
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 65, 69 (Joel
Wm. Friedman ed., 2006). Further, partners were bothered by “the arrogance and
self-centered attitude that Ann projects.” Id. at 70. Other partners saw her positive
attributes and her negatives, “I found her to be (a) singularly dedicated, (b) rather
unpleasant.” Id.
53
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234–35 (plurality opinion).
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situation. The reality of legitimate and illegitimate motives is likely
not as unique as the availability of evidence of both kinds of employer
motivation. It was the availability of both legitimate and illegitimate
evidence of employer motivation for the adverse employment action
against the plaintiff that made Price Waterhouse unique. A single-issue
case would mean that the employer was completely motivated by
lawful reasons or completely motivated by unlawful reasons. Such an
implication, however, conflicts with theories of human behavior that
tend to advance the notion of complex and multi-faceted motivations
55
in almost all decisions. Further, this simplified view of employment
decision making does not accurately account for agency. It is quite
possible, and more likely the case in larger organizations, for multiple
agents to possess different motives in rendering employment
decisions. For instance, a manager might be motivated to terminate
an employee because of her gender, but a human resources
department might be motivated only by that employee’s poor
interpersonal skills.
56
The Court produced no majority opinion in Price Waterhouse.
Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion established a new scheme for
proving discrimination. Under the plurality opinion, plaintiffs satisfy
their burden by proving that discrimination was a motivating part of
57
the employer’s decision.
The employer, according to Brennan’s
opinion, could escape liability by proving that it would have made the
58
same decisions regardless of the protected class.
While six justices agreed with Brennan’s two-prong and true
burden-shifting approach, they did not agree on the standard needed
59
for a case to fall into this classification.
Accordingly, Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence was widely accepted as the holding in the
54

See id. at 241 (“It is difficult for us to imagine that, in the simple words
‘because of,’ Congress meant to obligate a plaintiff to identify the precise causal role
played by legitimate and illegitimate motivations in the employment decision she
challenges.”).
55
See, e.g., Michael I. Norton et al., Mixed Motives and Racial Bias: The Impact of
Legitimate and Illegitimate Criteria on Decision Making, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 36,
47 (2006) (finding that decision makers unconsciously rely on racial information in
their decisions but mask its influence by inflating the value of non-racial
justifications); Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
109, 150–51 & n.142 (2007).
56
Price Waterhouse, 490 U. S. 228 (plurality opinion).
57
Id. at 240–42 (plurality opinion).
58
Id. (plurality opinion).
59
Price Waterhouse, 490 U. S. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (noting that the holding of the Court is the
narrowest point on which five justices agree).
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60

case. O’Connor’s concurrence states that the shift in the burden of
proof inherent in the mixed-motive analysis is only available when the
employee proves, with direct evidence, that the protected class was a
61
substantial factor in the employer’s decision.
Like Brennan’s
opinion, O’Connor’s holding allowed employers to escape liability if
they could prove that they would have made the same decision
regardless of the protected class. The dissenting justices opposed
burden shifting and argued that the plaintiff always bore the burden
of proving that discrimination was the “but for” cause of an
62
employer’s decision. In addition to arguing for a “but for” standard,
the dissenting justices contended that the holding created
63
unnecessary confusion for employers and courts.
64
Both of these arguments have merit. First, in the prior term,
65
the Court held in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust that the burden
of proof did not shift in adverse impact cases, and that courts and
66
commentators had misinterpreted Griggs v. Duke Power Co. for close
to twenty years. Thus, there was no real precedent for shifting the
burden. Second, it is not easy to put every piece of evidence into a
direct or circumstantial box. There were numerous cases in which
parties argued whether certain evidence could be considered direct
67
evidence.
Last, the term “substantial” eludes an easy, consistent
60

See, e.g., Kriss v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 58 F.3d 1276, 1282 (8th Cir. 1995);
Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 373–74 (3d Cir. 1994); Ostrowski v. Atlantic
Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, (2d Cir. 1992).
61
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276–78 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
62
Id. at 282–84 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
63
Id. at 286–93. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
64
For the differing definitions of “direct evidence,” see Shorter v. ICG Holdings,
Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 1999); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1141–42
(4th Cir. 1995); Ostrowski v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 181–83 (2d Cir. 1992);
see generally Belton, supra note 27.
65
487 U.S. 977 (1988).
66
401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that a policy requiring a high school education
and the passing of standardized tests as employment conditions though neutral on its
face was discriminatory” because it disparately impacted blacks).
67
See Tristin K. Green, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas Framework:
Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 87 CAL. L. REV.
983, 1005 n.122 (1999) (citing Trans World Airlines, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (finding a
policy to constitute direct evidence of a violation of the ADEA in which it made the
transfer method available to a disqualified captain dependent on age; City of Los
Angeles Dep’t. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 705 (1978) (finding a
policy to constitute direct evidence of discrimination in which it required that female
employees make larger contributions to a pension fund; Grant v. Hazelett StripCasting Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1569 (2d Cir. 1989) (treating a memorandum as direct
evidence of discrimination where the company president stated that he wanted to
hire a young man between the ages of thirty and forty).
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definition. Thus, in some cases, seemingly meaningless words or even
68
a court reporter’s error effectively determined the burden proof.
Despite these (and other) problems, McDonnell Douglas, Burdine, and
Price Waterhouse, when cobbled together, created a relatively
straightforward framework that shaped employment discrimination
claims. Cases with direct evidence in which discrimination played a
substantial role were labeled “mixed motive.”
Cases with
circumstantial or no evidence at all were analyzed under the “but for”
or “pretext” model. This framework, however, did not last long.
69
In St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, the plaintiff alleged that he
70
was terminated because of his race. The employer argued that it
terminated Hicks for violating rules, failing to supervise subordinates,
71
and for verbally threatening another employee. The district court
held that the articulated reasons were not true, but rather that the
termination was personal and that the plaintiff failed to prove that
72
race was the real reason behind the decision.
Accordingly, the
73
district court found for the employer. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
reversed and held that when the proffered reasons are found to be
untrue, the employee has proven pretext and the plaintiff wins as a
74
matter of law.
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the
plaintiff will prevail, as a matter of law, only if the employee proves
pretext and provides evidence that the real reason was
75
76
discrimination. Many commentators refer to this as “pretext plus.”
Despite Justice Souter’s assertions in his dissent, the case expressly
stated that fact finders were free to infer discrimination from a
77
finding of pretext, but they did not have to do so. Still, the reaction
68

For how courts have analyzed certain “code” words, see Ash v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006) (per curiam) (holding that an employer referring to
African American employees as “boy” potentially showed discriminatory animus);
McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “a
mere offensive utterance” may be evidence of a hostile work environment). In Austin
v. Cornell University, 891 F. Supp. 740 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), a deponent responded to the
question: “so you said you wanted some fresh blood?” with the question: “I did?” The
court reporter missed the inflection and the transcript stated: “I did.” The court
allowed a mixed motive instruction based on the deposition.
69
509 U.S. 502 (1993).
70
Id. at 505.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 508.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 508–09.
75
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 514–16.
76
See id. at 535–36 (Souter, J., dissenting).
77
Id. at 511.
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to Hicks from employee rights advocates was swift and strong.
Employee advocates contended that by requiring evidence of
discrimination, Hicks made prevailing in discrimination cases nearly
78
impossible for employees.
While impossible may be too strong,
Hicks did, in fact, alter the terrain of employment discrimination’s
rights assertion.
After Hicks, plaintiffs without evidence could only prevail if fact
79
finders inferred discrimination from a finding of pretext. In other
words, fact finders are free to conclude that while the proffered

78

See, e.g., Civil Rights Standards Restoration Act, S. 1776, 103d Cong. (1st Sess.
1993) (proposing an amendment to the Revised Statutes § 1979 that would restore
the pre-Hicks plaintiff’s burden in intentional discrimination cases); Employment
Discrimination Evidentiary Amendment of 1993, H.R. 2787, 103d Cong. (1st Sess.
1993) (proposing an amendment to Title VII that would override the majority
holding in Hicks); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After
Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229 (1995); Note, Title VII—Burden of Persuasion in Disparate
Treatment Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 342, 348 (1993) (arguing that requiring the
plaintiff to show direct evidence of intent “will severely curtail the ability of many
Title VII plaintiffs to succeed on their disparate treatment claims”); Sherie L. Coons,
Comment, Proving Disparate Treatment After St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: Is
Anything Left of McDonnell Douglas?, 19 J. CORP. L. 379, 408 (1994) (“The Hicks
majority’s holding is ill-conceived and furthers unsound policy because [it] . . . places
an impossible burden of persuasion on plaintiffs . . . .”); Derrick L. Horner, Recent
Development, Toward Clarifying the Ambiguity of Merging Burdens—St. Mary’s Honor
Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 205, 213 (1994)
(concluding that Hicks confronts plaintiffs with an “impossible burden of having to
disprove any reason for the employer’s action a factfinder might see sketched in the
record.”); Shannon R. Joseph, Note, Employment Discrimination: Shouldering the Burden
of Proof After St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 963, 988–89
(1994) (contrasting civil rights attorneys’ reactions to Hicks with that of management
attorneys and evaluating proposed legislation attempting to overturn Hicks); Michael
C. McPhillips, Note, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: The Casual Abandonment of Title
VII Precedent, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 1045, 1066 (1994) (“[T]he court’s newly-developed
burdens will make it impossible for many plaintiffs to get beyond summary
judgment . . . [and] might chill their initiation of legitimate claims.”); Louis M.
Rappaport, Note, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: Has the Supreme Court Turned its
Back on Title VII by Rejecting “Pretext-Only?”, 39 VILL. L. REV. 123 (1994); Ronald A.
Schmidt, Note, The Plaintiff’s Burden in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases:
Discrimination Vel Non—St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), 73
NEB. L. REV. 953, 976–81 (1994) (summarizing criticism of Hicks but concluding that
a Hicks plaintiff bears no greater burden than that of any other civil plaintiff); EEOC
Urges Congress to Overturn Supreme Court’s 1993 Hicks Decision, 1993 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA), Oct. 7, 1993, at D-7 (quoting EEOC Chairman as saying of post-Hicks
litigation, “it may be impossible to prove discrimination in the absence of direct
evidence, which is so rarely available”); Management, Civil Rights Attorneys Differ on
Effect of Hicks Decision, 1993 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 2, 1993, at D-26 (quoting
numerous employee groups characterizing the decision as a “hard blow to civil rights
advocates” and calling for a legislative response).
79
See Malamud, supra note 78 at 2243.
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reason is unworthy of belief, the employer did not discriminate. In
such instances, fact finders may find for employers. Assuming that
most plaintiffs’ lawyers work on a contingency fee arrangement, and
that they are rationally self-interested, it makes little sense for lawyers
to take cases in which they can satisfy their burden of proving pretext,
but can still end up with no damages or costs and fees assessments.
Put simply, betting on such an inference is a risky proposition for
plaintiffs’ lawyers. Professor Samuel Estreicher, one of the nation’s
leading experts on ADR and outspoken supporter of arbitration in
employment disputes, aptly refers to cases without evidence as
“orphan” cases because they are unlikely able to find a lawyer to
80
adopt them.
After Hicks, one would expect that plaintiffs’ lawyers would take
cases with direct evidence and ask for the mixed-motive jury
instruction, take cases with circumstantial evidence and accept the
pretext or but for instruction, and avoid cases with insufficient
evidence. Plaintiffs’ preference for mixed-motive cases should have
increased dramatically after the passage of the Civil Rights Act (CRA)
81
of 1991.
After the CRA of 1991, the distinction between mixed motive
and pretext changed from a theoretical one regarding the effect of
the burden of proof to a more tangible difference in available
82
damages. In addition to providing for jury trials in Title VII cases,
codifying the concept of, and altering the burden of proof in,
83
disparate impact cases, and adding punitive and compensatory
84
damages, the CRA of 1991 partially codified and partially
overturned Price Waterhouse’s mixed-motive scheme. First, the CRA of
1991 recognized that in addition to intentional discrimination
(disparate treatment) there is a second type of discrimination –
unintentional discrimination known as disparate (or adverse) impact:
(1) the plaintiff can demonstrate a disparate impact on the basis of a
protected class and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the
impact is job related and “consistent with business necessity,” or (2)
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the respondent refused to
80

See Robin Pogrebin & Edward Klaris, The Rules of the Game, THE L. SCH.,
Autumn 2006, at 25, 34, available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default
/files/ECM_PRO_061129.pdf.
81
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, § 102 (1991)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2011)).
82
§ 102(c) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2011)).
83
§ 105 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2011)).
84
§ 102(b) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (2011)).
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85

implement an “alternative employment practice.” Next, the CRA of
1991 altered the mixed-motive scheme. Under the CRA of 1991, the
plaintiff can satisfy the first prong and thus, shift the burden of proof
if the protected class is a motivating (as opposed to a substantial)
86
factor in the employer decision. Further, the employer does not
escape liability if it proves that it would have made the decision
87
regardless of the protected class. Instead, the judge may award such
plaintiffs a declaratory judgment and costs and attorney fees if they
88
can satisfy the first prong of the two-prong mixed-motive test.
Employers unable to satisfy the second prong are subject to back pay,
reinstatement, punitive damages, compensatory damages, and are
89
also liable for costs and fees.
As to be expected, the CRA of 1991 contained statutory gaps.
Two of these gaps directly affected the mixed-motive instruction and
the burden of proof. One was easily and logically decided. The
other is a source of contention without which there would be no
need for most of the scholarship on this topic. First, the CRA of 1991
did not distinguish between circumstantial and direct evidence. This
would be fine if the statute stated that the type of evidence was
irrelevant. It did not do this. Courts were split as to whether
90
O’Connor’s direct evidence requirement survived the CRA of 1991.
Second, the CRA of 1991 did not expressly amend the ADEA or
mention retaliation, leaving another open question: did the new
mixed-motive damage scheme apply to age, retaliation, and,
91
subsequently, the ADA? It took the Supreme Court twelve years to
92
answer the direct evidence question, seventeen years to resolve the
93
age question, and twenty-one years to answer the retaliation
94
95
Plaintiffs cheered the first ruling, while employers
question.
85

§ 105(a) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2011)); see
also
The
Civil
Rights
Act
of
1991,
EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov
/eeoc/history/35th/1990s/civilrights.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2013).
86
§ 107(a) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2011)).
87
Id. (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2011)).
88
Id. (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (2011)).
89
Id. (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2011)).
90
See Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13 at 918–19 & nn.109–15 (discussing the
circuit split over whether McDonnell Douglas applied to mixed-motive cases).
91
Congress passed the ADA one year before the CRA of 1991.
92
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (holding that there was no
need for direct evidence in order to obtain the mixed motive instruction).
93
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
94
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
95
See Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An Essay on the Quiet
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exhaled a sigh of relief after the second and third. The Court has
97
still not expressly ruled on the ADA.
In Costa the Court posed and answered a simple question: does
the CRA of 1991 require plaintiffs to provide direct evidence that
discrimination was a substantial factor in the employer’s decision to
98
99
receive a mixed-motive instruction? The answer is no. Both the
majority opinion and Justice O’Connor’s concurrence state that the
only conclusion to be drawn from Congress’ replacement of the term
“substantial” with “motivating” and its failure to mention direct
evidence is that any evidence that discrimination motivated the
100
Along
employer is enough to warrant a mixed-motive instruction.
with opening the mixed-motive instruction to a significant number of
cases, Costa destroyed the employment discrimination litigation
framework that had developed over time by the lower courts. After
Costa, pretext cases were limited to situations in which there was no
evidence. As stated above, however, because plaintiffs’ lawyers should
be reluctant to take these “orphan” cases, it seemed that all cases
101
transmogrified into mixed-motive cases. Because of its widespread
use, the term “mixed motive” should be replaced by “motivating
factor.”
102
All cases did not, however, become motivating-factor cases for
Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a “Mixed-Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 79 (2003)
(“[T]he quiet little revolution started in Costa will be one of the most significant
advances for civil rights enforcement in the twenty-first century.”).
96
See David G. Savage, Age Bias Much Harder To Prove; The Supreme Court Shifts the
Burden of Proof to the Worker Making the Claim. Businesses Cheer., L.A. TIMES, June 19,
2009, at A1 (“Businesses applauded the decision in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services . . . .”); see also Leigh A. Van Ostrand, Note, A Close Look at ADEA MixedMotive Claims and Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 399
(2009).
97
It seems logical that, absent Congressional intervention, courts will follow the
Court in ADA cases.
98
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003).
99
Id. at 101–02 (“[D]irect evidence of discrimination is not required in mixedmotive cases . . . .”).
100
See id. at 102 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
101
See Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and
Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 861 (2004); Henry L.
Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate Treatment
Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 102–03 (2004). For further insight into the debate, see
William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 212–19 (2003); Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law:
Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887 (2004).
102
Reports of McDonnell Douglas’ death were greatly exaggerated. In fact, a Lexis
search conducted by Professor Prenkert found that in the six-month period between
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two reasons. First, plaintiffs’ lawyers were reluctant to ask for the
instruction. Lawyers representing employers report that they have
had numerous cases in which the motivating-factor instruction is
103
proper, but the employee’s counsel did not ask for the instruction.
These lawyers surmised that the instruction can be confusing and
that award of costs and fees, but no damages, is difficult to explain to
clients.
Second, courts simply did not know if the motivating factor
applied to ADEA, retaliation, and ADA cases. McDonnell Douglas and
its progeny’s burden-shifting scheme had always applied to ADEA
104
and retaliation cases. Indeed, after Price Waterhouse and before the
CRA of 1991, the mixed-motive instruction was available in age
105
cases.
The CRA, however, did not amend the ADEA or discuss
106
This placed courts in a difficult situation: apply the
retaliation.
CRA of 1991 to age and retaliation cases despite the lack of
Congressional guidance; apply Price Waterhouse, which had been
modified by the CRA of 1991; or hold that after Congress codified
and strengthened the mixed-motive instruction in race, sex, color,
national origin, and religion cases, Congress intended to force age
and retaliation cases to be labeled single motive cases. In choosing
this last option, courts would effectively hold that Congress intended
to outlaw motivation based on the five classes protected by Title VII,
but allow it in age, retaliation and likely ADA cases.
Somewhat shockingly, the Court in Gross and Nassar held that
December 2006 to May 2007, courts used the McDonnell Douglas framework in over
400 cases. Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of Second-Order Uniformity in Disparate
Treatment Law: McDonnell Douglas’s Longevity and the Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 AMER.
BUS. L.J. 511, 538 n.142 (2008).
103
Proskauer’s Joe Baumgarten stated such at the Cornell Labor & Employment
Roundtable in May of 2007 and the other lawyers present, including Gregg Gilman
(Davis & Gilbert), Ilene Berman (Taylor English), and Paul Wagner (Stokes Wagner)
agreed. This Annual Roundtable began in 2002 and features partners from wellrespected labor and employment law firms, in-house counsel, and professors from
several different law firms. See Labor and Employment Roundtable, CORNELL U. SCH.
HOTEL
ADMIN.,
http://www.hotelschool.cornell.edu/research/chr/events
/roundtables/recent/labor.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
104
A retaliation claim involves different prima facie elements: (1) did the
employee engage in a protected expression; (2) was the employee discriminated
against again; and (3) is there a link between elements one and two. See Gonzalez v.
Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1035 (7th Cir. 1998). At this point the
burdens for retaliation are identical to that in McDonnell Douglas. See id.
105
See, e.g., Visser v. Packer Eng’g Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1991)
(referring to similar cases as “mixed motive age discrimination” cases).
106
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102 (1991) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2011)).
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Congress’ intent is found in the third option above. What makes this
problematic is that the Court focuses on the fact that both the ADEA
and the retaliation provision of Title VII use the phrase “because
107
of.” The Court has now held twice that such language is evidence
of Congressional intent to require but-for causation. The problem is
108
The Court in Price
that Title VII uses the exact same language.
Waterhouse interpreted Title VII’s language to create the mixed109
motive scheme.
After the mixed-motive scheme was codified and
strengthened by CRA 1991, the Court held that the same language
110
requires but-for proof in three other statutes. This inconsistency in
interpretation is difficult to understand or justify.
In a prior article, two of this Article’s authors discussed how the
111
two schemes are used and whether they should both still be used.
Again, it is beyond the scope of this Article to report in detail how the
two schemes are, and if they should be, applied. It is, however,
important to know that McDonnell Douglas, in most jurisdictions, is
112
used in the summary judgment phase only and is deemed no longer
113
relevant in cases that go to trial. Instead, the jury instruction simply
107

Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 183 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he Court interprets the words ‘because of’ in the ADEA as colloquial shorthand
for ‘but-for’ causation.” (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240
(1989) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Univ. of Tex. Sw.
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2545 (2013). (“The meaning of ‘because’ in Title
VII’s retaliation provision should be read to mean just what the Court held ‘because’
means for ADEA-liability purposes.”) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
108
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, §105(a) (1991) (codified as
amended in scattered subsections of 42 U.S.C. § 21) (making it unlawful to engage in
discrimination “because of race, color, religion sex, or national origin”).
109
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240–41 (1989) (plurality opinion).
110
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2011) (“[T]o discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”).
111
See generally Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13.
112
See Kristina N. Klein, Note, Oasis or Mirage? Desert Palace and Its Impact on the
Summary Judgment Landscape, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1177, 1186–87 (2006) (discussing
McDonnell Douglas in the context of summary judgment).
113
See Sandra F. Sperino, Recreating Diversity in Employment Law by Debunking the
Myth of the McDonnell Douglas Monolith, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 349, 376–78 (2007)
(chronicling the case law of the circuits in great detail); See also Whittington v.
Nordam Grp. Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 997–98 (10th Cir. 2005); Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med.
Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 576 (5th Cir. 2004); Sanders v. N.Y. City Human Res. Admin.,
361 F.3d 749, 758 (2d Cir. 2004); Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328 F.3d 532, 539–40
(9th Cir. 2003); Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999)
(“We stress that it is unnecessary and inappropriate to instruct the jury on the
McDonnell Douglas analysis.”); Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir.
1994); Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130, 1137 (4th Cir.
1988) (arguing that the “shifting burdens of production of Burdine . . . are beyond
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asks the jurors to decide if the employer made its decision “because
114
This is an odd result jurisprudentially
of” the protected class.
speaking, to say the least. Conversely, the entire motivating-factor
scheme, when applied, has always been fully present in the jury
115
instruction. After Costa, however, some courts used the motivating
116
factor scheme in summary judgments while others refused to do so.
B. The Current and Proposed State of Employment Discrimination
Law
Title VII plaintiffs may request the motivating-factor instruction,
and they should. Judges, however, can choose whether or not to give
117
the instruction.
The judicial decision as to whether a case is a
the function and expertise of the jury” as well as “overly complex”).
114
See Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 221–22 (3d Cir. 2000)
(holding that it is improper to instruct the jury on the McDonnell Douglas burden
shifting scheme, but it is proper “to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the
factual predicates necessary to establish the prima facie case have been shown”);
Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d 119, 127 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Instructing the jury
on the elements of a prima facie case, presumptions, and the shifting burden of
proof is unnecessary and confusing. Instead, the court should instruct the jury to
consider the ultimate question of whether defendant terminated plaintiff because of
his age.”); but see Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 167 & n.9 (6th Cir. 1993)
(holding that it was proper to “guid[e] the jury through a three-stage order of proof
as opposed to instructing the jury solely on the ultimate issue of sex discrimination”),
abrogated on other grounds by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010); see also Brown
v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 338 F.3d 586, 595–99 (6th Cir. 2003) (Clay, J.,
concurring); Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1425–26 & n.3 (10th
Cir. 1993); Lynch v. Belden & Co., 882 F.2d 262, 269 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[I]t was
proper for the district court to instruct the jury as to the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
formula for evaluating indirect evidence.”); Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832
F.2d 194, 200 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[T]he district court was correct in using the
[McDonnell Douglas] framework in the instructions to the jury.”), abrogated on other
grounds by Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1999).
115
See, e.g., Donovan v. Milk Mktg. Inc., 243 F.3d 584, 586 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“[W]hen the jury might reasonably conclude on the evidence that both illegal
discrimination and legitimate non-discriminatory reasons were present in an
employer’s decision-making process, the court may charge the jury on mixedmotivation in accordance with Price Waterhouse.”).
116
See generally Kerry S. Acocella, Note, Out with the Old and in with the New: The
Second Circuit Shows It’s Time for the Supreme Court to Finally Overrule McDonnell
Douglas, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 125 (2004).
117
See, e.g., Sukenic v. County of Maricopa, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31837 (D. Az
2004) stating:
In the last paragraph of the Court’s Opinion in Costa, the Court
explicitly adopted a standard equivalent to Rule 50(a), Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, for judgment as a matter of law in jury trials, for
determining if a plaintiff was entitled to obtain a mixed-motive
instruction. Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. at 101, 123 S. Ct. at 2155.
We contend that having the court “label” the case is waste of time.
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motivating factor case could best be described as difficult to
categorize and understand. In every case that makes it to trial, the
employee alleges discrimination and the employer claims that the
employee deserved the adverse employment action for nondiscriminatory reasons. One of three truths should emerge: (1) the
employer discriminated; (2) the employer did not discriminate
against the employee; or (3) there were both legitimate and
illegitimate reasons operating simultaneously. Deciding which of the
118
three occurred is the job of the jury and thus, the POWADA
correctly allows any discrimination plaintiff to select their preferred
119
scheme. The problem with POWADA is that it includes retaliation
120
plaintiffs. Below, we explain from a doctrinal standpoint why
retaliation is like the Orwellian quote from Animal Farm mentioned at
the beginning of the Article—it is equal but somehow more equal
Such analysis is a waste of time because if the employee has no
evidence of discrimination, the court should dismiss the case. If the
employer has no evidence of legitimate reasons, the court should find
for the employee. In all other cases, the court should provide a mixed
motive instruction. More problematic is that having a judge label a
case as “mixed motive” presupposed the holding of the jury.
Accordingly, the jury instruction should be referred to as the
motivating factor instruction. Because it is the role of the jury to
determine whether the evidence presented by each side is credible, it
seems clear that all discrimination plaintiffs should be allowed to prove
and all juries should decide their cases, under the same instruction.
118
References to Price Waterhouse as a “mixed-motive” case imply that McDonnell
Douglas cases are “single-motive” cases. This distinction makes little or no sense.
First, absent certain reprehensible behavior, such as workplace violence, it is illogical
to think that sophisticated business decision makers hire, fire, promote, or demote
people for any individual reason. Instead, human resources departments have multistep procedures to make such decisions. It is even harder to believe that forty-five
years after Title VII, in a multi-cultural society where diversity is often easily seen and
judged, numerous employers base a business decision exclusively on a protected
class. If this were the case, it would surely trigger quick litigation. Moreover, the fact
that the majority of discrimination cases are discharge cases makes the single motive
argument even less persuasive. The company at least initially hired the terminated
employee. Unless there was a change in decision-making personnel, this means that
the hiring employees were not racists or sexists when they first hired the employee,
but became discriminators when they made termination decisions. Employers
typically rely on numerous factors in the employment context, many legitimate and,
unfortunately, some unlawful. There is another reason to argue against the
bifurcated single-motive versus mixed-motive label. Currently, judges decide to label
the case before it goes to the jury. We contend that whether the case is a singlemotive case (assuming this is possible) or mixed-motive case is a question for the
jury.
119
Protecting Older Workers against Discrimination Act, H.R. 2852, 113th. Cong.
(1st Sess. 2013).
120
Id.
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121

III. EMPLOYER RETALIATION
Retaliation cases have more than doubled in the last twenty years
and there are now more retaliation claims than any other
122
employment discrimination cause of action.
As most employers
know and employees come to understand, employees may not file
discrimination charges in federal court without first filing such
charges with either the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) or an affiliated state agency (commonly referred to as Fair
123
Employment Practices Agencies (FEPA)). As a result, tracking the
percentages of claims alleging violations of anti-discrimination
employment statutes may be accomplished by analyzing EEOC or
FEPA charge filing statistics. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the EEOC
and state FEPAs received about the same number of charges each
124
year.
FEPA charge data are often difficult to find and may be
incomplete. EEOC data, by contrast, are readily available and are
more likely complete. This is why we rely on EEOC data regarding
enforcement of Title VII, ADEA, ADA, and the Equal Pay Act. In the
last twenty-one years, total employment discrimination charges filed
with the EEOC have ranged from a low of 72,302 charges in 1992, to
125
126
a high of 99,947 in 2011.
In 2012, 99,412 charges were filed.
Because of this year-to-year fluctuation, using the raw numbers to
evaluate which claims are most prevalent is not informative. Instead,
we analyze the percentage change in claims filed per year. The
largest single year-to-year percentage change occurred in Americans
127
with Disabilities (ADA) claims filed in 1992 and 1993. Only 1.4% of
121

See ORWELL, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2013, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc
/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
123
Filing a Charge of Discrimination, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/employees
/lawsuitcharge.cfm (last visited Jan. 4, 2014); Filing a Lawsuit, EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014);
124
Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov
/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
125
Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc
/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014); Charge Statistics FY
1997
Through
FY
2012,
EEOC,
http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics
/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
126
Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Reports Nearly 100,000 Job Bias Charges in Fiscal
Year
2012
(Jan.
28,
2013),
available
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc
/newsroom/release/1-28-13.cfm.
127
Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc
/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014); Charge Statistics FY
122
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the cases filed in 1992 were ADA cases, but that number exploded to
128
This jump can be attributed to the ADA taking
17.4% in 1993.
129
Beginning in 1993, the ADA cases have made
effect in July 1992.
130
up between 17.4% and 26.5% of EEOC filings.
Besides disability,
the greatest fluctuation in any claim based on a protected class was
the 7.2% differential between ADEA cases filed in 1992 (27.1%) and
131
the cases filed in 1995 (19.9 %).
In 2012, ADEA cases made up
132
23.0% of the total claims filed. These fluctuations may be the result
of random variability. In any event, little in the way of trends can be
discerned in these statistics. There is, however, one cause of action
that exhibited a dramatic linear increase that is almost certainly nonrandom—retaliation.
In 1993, retaliation claims made up 15.7% of the total cases
133
134
brought. By 2013, that percentage more than doubled to 41.1%.
In 2009, both retaliation and race accounted for 36% of the claims.
Since 2010, retaliation cases have supplanted race as the most
135
prevalent claim. Moreover, unlike any other category, retaliation’s
percentages did not rise and fall throughout the time period in
question. Instead, except for a slight drop from 2001 to 2002 (27.5%
to 27.0%), retaliation cases, as a percentage of total cases filed, rose
136
each year.
The increase in the percentage of retaliation cases is not, as one
would logically surmise, accompanied by a decrease in the

1997
Through
FY
2012,
EEOC,
http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics
/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
128
Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc
/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
129
Id.
130
Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc
/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014); Charge Statistics FY
1997 Through FY 2012, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement
/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
131
Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov
/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014); Charge
Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics
/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
132
Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2013, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc
/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
133
Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc
/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
134
Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2013, EEOC, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc
/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
135
Id.
136
Id.
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percentages of other employment discrimination claims. The reason
that the percentages can exceed 100 is that a single employee can
137
For
allege discrimination under more than one cause of action.
example, assume that a forty-five year old African-American woman,
who is Jewish and blind, files a charge against a potential employer
who failed to hire her. Based on one incident, this individual can
allege discrimination based on age, race, sex, religion, and disability.
Each theory of discrimination would be tallied despite the fact that
they arose from a single charge filed.
Between 1997 and 2012, the percentage of “cases” rose from
145.6% to 170.3%. Over the same time period, the percentage of
138
retaliation cases rose 15.5%.
While it is possible that the 15.5%
increase in retaliation cases resulted from mostly stand-alone cases, a
large portion of the increase is likely fueled by what some refer to as
“tack-on” cases. Retaliation tack-on cases are cases that allege a
violation based on one of the seven protected classes with a
retaliation case “tacked-on.”
Tacking on additional claims to a complaint is relatively
inexpensive. The obvious benefit of tacking on claims is the creation
139
of an additional basis from which to recover. As explained below,
even if the underlying claim fails, employees may nonetheless
succeed on a retaliation claim. Retaliation claims may also augment
the perceived legitimacy of underlying claims. Plaintiffs alleging
retaliation may be more likely to be regarded as having attempted to
resolve a workplace problem without resort to the courts. Such
behaviors may appear reasonable to a fact finder, and they may
reduce the impression that the plaintiff is only ex post attempting to
extort money from an employer.
In addition to serving as tack-on claims for plaintiffs in protected
categories, retaliation is an attractive cause of action because an
employee may file a complaint when he is not a member of a
protected class affected by an underlying claim and when the only
140
evidence of discrimination is the timing of an employer’s actions.
In this instance, retaliation opens the door to a number of arguably
less meritorious claims. Lawyers representing employers may argue
137

For example in 2012 the total percentages of claims were 170.1%. Id.
Id.
139
Joan M. Savage, Note, Adopting the EEOC Deterrence Approach to the Adverse
Employment Action Prong in a Prima Facie Case for Title VII Retaliation, 46 B.C. L. REV.
215, 219 & n.36 (2004) (“Retaliation charges serve as independent legal claims,
which do not depend on the validity of the underlying claim.”).
140
Id. at 219–20; see infra note 179 and accompanying text.
138
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that employees make frivolous complaints of discrimination as a
temporary means of establishing job security, particularly when the
141
The supposed job security
threat of losing one’s job is high.
involves the likelihood of a stand-alone retaliation claim, which is the
natural outgrowth of such a complaint. It is not irrational for an
employee with a job (as opposed to a career) to consider
complaining about unlawful behavior as a form of insurance against
an employer taking adverse employment action against him. An
inverse correlation likely exists between the degree to which an
employee is in a job with few available alternatives and the likelihood
of engagement in this type of behavior.
On a more practical level, compared to discrimination,
retaliation is easier for employees to identify and juries to
142
understand. Discrimination can be subtle and difficult to interpret.
Employees may wonder whether the employer is basing a decision on
the employee’s protected class or because of a personal dislike or
other non-discriminatory reason. Retaliation, by definition, follows a
143
complaint or another clear action, and the employee consequently
feels confident in the reason for adverse treatment. In addition,
144
lawyers report that juries are often skeptical about discrimination.
Without a “smoking gun” evidencing a specific employer action or
pattern, it is often difficult to convince a jury that the employer’s
negative feelings about a protected class were so strong that that the
employer was willing to take a discriminatory action and thereby risk
the time, money, and negative publicity associated with a
145
discrimination lawsuit. This is especially true in discharge cases in
which it is often difficult for juries to accept that an employer hired a
member of a protected class but then terminated the employee
because of that same class. It may seem illogical for an employer to
not discriminate at the time of hiring the plaintiff but then to
discriminate at the time of the employee’s discharge. Alternatively,
people tend to more readily appreciate that employers (and their
141

Proskauer’s Joe Baumgarten said as much at the Cornell Labor &
Employment Roundtable in May of 2007. See supra note 103.
142
See B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83 TUL. L. REV. 439, 469 (2008) (“Because the
juror can more easily project his or her own revenge or retaliation instinct in a
similar situation, he or she may more easily conclude that retaliation played a role in
the adverse decision made.”).
143
Retaliation, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/retaliation.cfm (last
visited Feb. 15 2014).
144
See supra note 103.
145
See supra note 103; see also, Norton et al, supra note 55, at 37–38 (discussing
why racial bias is a difficult thing to prove).
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agents) may become upset and angry when being accused of
discrimination, whether falsely or fairly, and therefore likely want to
retaliate against the individual making those accusations. Because it
is easy for employees to identify and juries to understand, plaintiffs’
lawyers, acting as rational, self-interested actors that must decide
whether to invest their time and money in each case with which they
are presented, are often more interested in retaliation cases than
146
other types of discrimination cases, all else being equal.
A case in
which the employee can identify unlawful actions based on an easily
understandable unlawful motivation is more attractive to most jury
147
members.
Finally, as explained below, when using the pretext
standard, retaliation cases are easier to prove than traditional
discrimination cases.
A. The Law of Employer Retaliation
After Nassar, to establish a case of retaliation under either clause,
employees must prove that they engaged in a “protected activity,” that
they were discriminated against, and that there is a link between the
148
protected activity and the adverse employment action.
A protected expression, for retaliation purposes, can occur
149
under either the participation or the opposition clause.
An
employee invokes the participation clause when he or she takes part
(e.g., as a party or witness) in a Title VII, ADEA, or ADA proceeding
150
(e.g., agency investigation or litigation).
The opposition clause
applies to situations in which an employee complains that the
151
employer violated a discrimination law.
The complaint did not
come as part of a discrimination proceeding and is instead based on
an internal complaint, other notification to management, or even the
152
filing of a claim. Regardless of which applies, it is important to note
that the discrimination at issue does not have to involve the
153
complaining employee.
For example, a male employee who
146

See supra note 103.
See George, supra note 142, at 469 (“Because the juror can more easily project
his or her own revenge or retaliation instinct in a similar situation, he or she may
more easily conclude that retaliation played a role in the adverse decision made.”).
148
See Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1035 (7th Cir.
1998).
149
George, supra note 142, at 446–51.
150
George, supra note 142, at 446–47 & nn.27–30.
151
George, supra note 142, at 447–50.
152
George, supra note 142, at 447–51.
153
George, supra note 142, at 447 (“[T]his protection extends not only to the
147
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testifies at trial or complains to his employer that women are being
sexually harassed has engaged in a protected expression under the
participation or opposition clause. Still, what constitutes a protected
expression is sometimes a challenging question.
154
In Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale and Retail Stores, the Fifth
Circuit addressed the definition of a protected expression in
opposition clause cases. Employee Payne believed that his employer
refused to hire people of color into positions in which the employees
155
would have to handle money. Payne, who was temporarily laid off
each summer, joined a civil-rights group that picketed in front of the
156
After the picketing occurred, the employer did
employer’s store.
not rehire Payne, who alleged retaliation under the opposition
157
clause.
The employer argued that because Payne’s allegations of
racial discrimination were unfounded, there could not be a protected
158
expression.
The employer asserted that employees could not
succeed on a retaliation claim unless they proved that the underlying
159
claim of employment discrimination did, in fact, occur.
In rejecting the employer’s argument, the court held that the
employee engaged in a protected expression even if the underlying
160
claim failed and the employer had not, in fact, violated the law.
Instead, the court explained, the employee need only have
161
reasonable belief that the subject of the complaint was true. Other
courts hold that to be protected, the expression must be in good faith
162
as well as reasonable.
An expression is considered to be held in
good faith if the employee truly believes the alleged conduct
occurred. An employee has a reasonable belief if there is a basis on
employee who filed the complaint but also to anyone who testifies or otherwise
participates in the investigation or hearing.”).
154
654 F.2d 1130 (5th Cir. 1981).
155
Id. at 1135–36.
156
Id. at 1134–35.
157
Id. at 1135.
158
Id. at 1137.
159
Id.
160
Payne, 654 F.2d at 1137.
161
See id. at 1140 & n.11.
162
See, e.g., Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960
(11th Cir. 1997) (“[A] plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of retaliation under
the opposition clause of Title VII if he shows that he had a good faith, reasonable
belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices . . . . A
plaintiff must not only show that he subjectively (that is, in good faith) believed that
his employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices, but also that his belief
was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented.”). The court
referred to a good faith belief as one that is “honest and bona fide.” Id.
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which to believe that the alleged conduct did occur, and if true, the
163
conduct would violate the law.
The participation clause protects an employee who participates
in any Title VII procedure regardless of the extent of such
164
participation.
In fact, the EEOC guidelines state that the
protection under the participation clause applies to testifying,
assisting, and preparing affidavits in conjunction with a proceeding
165
or investigation under Title VII, ADEA, ADA, or EPA.
These
present very broad parameters on which to base a claim. For
instance, an employee who files an EEOC charge or who assists
another in filing or preparing such a charge qualifies as being in a
protected class. This is the case even if the charge is not true, not
166
reasonable, or not even brought in good faith.
As the Second
Circuit noted in Deravin v. Kerik, the participation clause “is expansive
167
and seemingly contains no limitations.”
No case illustrates this
168
point more clearly than Merritt v. Dillard Paper Company. There, the
Eleventh Circuit held that a company could not discharge an
employee for his admitted sexual harassment when the admission
169
occurred as part of testimony proffered in a Title VII case.
The application of the opposition and participation clauses
makes sense: not requiring an opposing plaintiff to prove the truth of
the underlying claim prevents the chilling effect of possible dismissal
for speaking up. If employees are protected only when they can
prove that their employer violated the law, employees will be
reluctant to use company harassment policies or otherwise complain
about discrimination. Because the Supreme Court, numerous lower
courts, and commentators consistently contend that the key to
ending discrimination is employee complaints followed by swift

163

Payne, 654 F.2d at 1140–41. Payne reasonably believed McLemore’s hiring
and promotional practices violated Title VII. Id. at 1141. The minority position
requires the plaintiff to hold a good-faith belief that the employer violated the law.
See Ficus v. Triumph Grp. Operations, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1241 (D. Kan. 1998).
164
EEOC, Directives Transmittal, EEOC Compliance Manual, Vol. 2 § 8-II(C)(1),
8-8–8-9, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.pdf.
165
Id. at 8-2.
166
See, e.g., Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(“The participation clause . . . has accordingly been interpreted as shielding recourse
to the EEOC, regardless of the ultimate resolution of the underlying claim on its
merits.”).
167
335 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 2003).
168
120 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 1997).
169
Id. at 1182.
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170

employer action, this chilling effect needs to be curbed. Similarly,
employees should not fear participating in EEOC investigations or
litigation because of their perceptions that unlawful employer activity
may not constitute violations of the discrimination law and thus, they
could be terminated for such testimony. The competing incentives
make it difficult to craft bright-line parameters that toe the line in
this area without tipping the balance and yielding undesirable results
in either direction.
B. The Supreme Court’s Characterization of Employer Retaliation
In the five years prior to Nassar, the Supreme Court issued three
“employee friendly” retaliation decisions that made it easier for
employees to prove retaliation. What makes these cases relevant to
the discussion here is that in two of the cases the Supreme Court
expanded retaliation to include types of harm and classes of plaintiffs
not protected in other statutes. In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
171
Railway Company v. White, the Court held that, unlike the other
protected classes, a plaintiff in a retaliation case did not have to suffer
172
an adverse employment action. Instead, an employee simply had to
prove that the employer’s response to a complaint of discrimination
was one that would dissuade a reasonable person from complaining
173
in the future. The theory underwriting the ruling seemed to accord
with the principle that the best way to eradicate discrimination is to
encourage employees to complain and that most impediments to
such ability to complain would undermine this goal and should
174
therefore be considered unlawful retaliation.
After Burlington
Northern, allegations of retaliation included conduct such as receiving
175
a poor performance
the “cold shoulder” (being ignored),
176
177
evaluation, and issuance of a performance improvement plan.
170

See, e.g., Wilson v. Moulison N. Corp., 639 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[T]he
company’s response was both swift and appropriate. After hearing the plaintiff’s
complaint, [the company’s chief executive and owner] immediately looked into it,
concluded that the misconduct had occurred, and reprimanded [the plaintiff’s
coworkers] in very strong terms.”).
171
548 U.S. 53 (2006).
172
Id. at 67–70.
173
Id. (“[T]o retaliate by excluding an employee from a weekly training lunch
that contributes significantly to the employee’s professional advancement might well
deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination.”).
174
See id.
175
Johnson v. Weld Cnty., 594 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2010).
176
Weber v. Battista, 494 F.3d 179 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
177
Michael v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 496 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007).
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The Court’s decisions, taken together, imply that retaliation is more
equal than the other protected classes.
178
In Thompson v. North American Stainless, the Court took the
application of this principle one step further by holding that a
retaliation plaintiff need not even engage in a protected
179
expression. In Thompson, the employer terminated the complaining
180
The Court applied the so-called “zone of
employee’s fiancé.
interest” protection under which a complaining employee’s fiancé
181
and, we presume, spouse, is protected from retaliation.
Whether
this logic similarly extends to siblings, parents, children, boyfriends,
girlfriends, best friends, roommates, or other relationships will likely
form the basis of litigation. In Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t., 555 U.S. 271
(2009), the third Supreme Court retaliation case, the Court held that
an employee who, during an in-house investigation, stated that she
had seen sexual harassment was opposing discrimination, despite the
fact that she never complained and did not express any horror or
182
even disgust. By expanding the definition of protected expression
and discrimination, the retaliation trilogy—Crawford, Burlington
Northern, Thompson, and Crawford v. Metropolitan Government, made
retaliation even more attractive to plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ lawyers
because both stand alone and tack-on retaliation cases are
significantly easier to get to a jury. Again, these cases stand for the
principle that retaliation is more equal than other forms of unlawful
employment discrimination.
C. Retaliation Is More Equal Than Other Employment Discrimination
Claims
Similar to the Supreme Court, we also contend that retaliation
differs from other causes of action in the employment discrimination
context for two key reasons. First, a truly innocent employer can not
only have its business and reputation destroyed, but the law also
forces the employer to continue to employ the person who seriously
damaged the company. An examination of the Payne case illustrates
183
this point.
Assume for the sake of illustration that Payne’s

178

131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
Id. at 870. (“We know of no other context in which the words carry this
artificially narrow meaning.”).
180
Id. at 867.
181
Id. at 870.
182
In Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t., 555 U.S. 271 (2009).
183
See supra notes 154–169 and accompanying discussion.
179
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allegation was false, even though Payne believed it to be true.
Assume further that the employer in Payne offered the money-related
job in question to its two most senior employees, both of whom were
individuals of color. Assume that the two employees of color turned
down the job. The employer is disappointed but believed it was the
employees’ decision to make and thus offered the position to the
third most senior employee, a white employee, who accepts the job.
Payne, however, has no way of knowing how the hiring decision was
made. Instead, Payne observes no people of color in positions in
which employees handle money and jumps to a logical, albeit
erroneous, conclusion that the two most senior employees, both of
whom were African-American, were passed over for the open position
in favor of a white employee. Payne notifies the company and the
EEOC of his belief that the employer violated the law (thus activating
the opposition clause). The EEOC investigates and soon the local
newspaper publishes a front-page story about the investigation. A
protest ensues outside the employer’s front door, and people hold
signs accusing the employer of being a racist. Online media picks up
the story too. The employer’s business suffers, the owners’ standing
in the community is diminished, and the owners’ families are
attacked due to the false accusation. Furious at being maligned, the
owners do not wish to continue to employ the individual whose false
accusations caused all of this pain and suffering. They could not
tolerate continuing to pay someone whose judgment they did not
trust and someone whom they feel stabbed the company in the back.
The owners want to terminate the employee but do not because
the law prohibits it. Several months after the complaint and the
accompanying fall out, employee Payne violates company policy by
providing his company discount to a friend. The company has a strict
policy of terminating employees who engage in such action and can
prove that it has terminated several other employees who engaged in
such conduct but had never complained about discrimination and
were not part of the same protected class as Payne. At trial the
plaintiff’s attorney asks one of the company’s owners if the accusation
of discrimination angered her and if she was relieved to have Payne
off the payroll. Regardless of how she answers, given the facts, we
propose that most juries would infer that the owner was angry and is
now relieved. In fact, we contend that even if there was little fall out,
most employers would not wish to continue to employ an individual
who accused the company of reprehensible behavior, and thus, would
be relieved at the opportunity to legitimately terminate such an
individual’s employment.
This is a perfect cross-examination
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question because no matter how the witness responds, the case is
made for the plaintiff. Either the jury will believe that the witness is
lying if she says that she harbored no ill will towards Payne for
accusing her of being a racist because that seems so implausible, or if
the witness says she did harbor ill will towards Payne, the jury will
think that the witness admitted having a retaliatory motive. This
illustrates our central point that retaliation claims are more equal
than other employment discrimination claims. No analogous Scylla
and Charybdis cross-examination question like this one exists in
other discrimination contexts; however, it is not clear whether and to
what extent the hypothetical juror reaction posited here is
empirically valid.
It is likely that jurors will be quicker to infer retaliation than
other protected classifications as motivating employer conduct. This
is because, as human beings, most people can relate to being
motivated to retaliate against someone who wrongs you. That instinct
184
likely predates the Bible and may be a part of innate human nature
185
across cultures. This obviously cannot be said of other motives for
discrimination. Particularly, as some have come to regard racial
discrimination as becoming less prevalent, it is even more likely that
individuals will be slower to impute racial motives to employer actions
186
in the absence of direct evidence of discrimination.
If a white
employer failed to promote a Hispanic employee, how frequently
would a jury infer that discrimination was a motivating factor?
Conversely, all things equal, if an employer failed to promote an
employee who complained that other employees were being racially
discriminated and sexually harassed, how much more or less
frequently would a jury infer that retaliation was a motivating factor?
Keeping the facts almost identical, this is what we sought to find out
by repeating our 2010 mock jury study but modifying the national
original fact pattern used there to a claim of unlawful retaliation.
184

See Christopher Boehm, Retaliatory Violence in Human Prehistory, 51 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 518 (2011).
185
See, e.g., Simon Gächter & Benedikt Herrmann, Reciprocity, Culture and Human
Cooperation: Previous Insights and a New Cross-Cultural Experiment, 364 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 791 (2009); Karl Sigmund, Punish
or Perish? Retaliation and Collaboration among Humans, 22 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY &
EVOLUTION 593 (2007); see also, Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony
and the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419 (2003) (discussing the
retributive psychology of punishment and experimentally testing this in a laboratory
setting).
186
See Jonathon Hunyor, Skin-deep: Proof and Inferences of Racial Discrimination in
Employment, 25 SYDNEY L. REV. 535, 551–54 (2003).
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Before discussing the results from our retaliation study, we briefly
describe our prior national origin study.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACT OF BURDENS OF PROOF
ON JUROR DECISION MAKING
Do employees alleging retaliation fare better at trial than
employees alleging discrimination based on other protected classes?
General methodological limits and problems specific to jury
instruction research limit our ability to answer this question as
definitively as we would like. First, selection bias lurks, as not all
187
litigated legal cases are reported, and the stream of cases that are
188
Second, the overwhelming majority of
reported is non-random.
189
cases settle and, increasingly, settlements are confidential. Third,
even if all employment discrimination lawsuits went to trial (and did
not settle) and generated published legal opinions, factual, legal, and
contextual variations across cases complicate efforts to generalize.
Our prior research focused on whether the “motivating-factor”
190
versus the “but-for” jury instruction influences case outcomes.
Using an experimental mock jury research design, our results
demonstrated how jury instruction variations in the employment
191
discrimination context can inform case outcomes.
Assuming facts
that could support the claim as much as deny it, employers have a
substantially equal chance of prevailing in pretext and motivating
factor cases, but we found a “non-trivial chance that a motivating
192
factor instruction will result in costs and fees being awarded.”
Consequently, we suggested that employers are better off with a
187

See Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 246 (2001) (“The most important caveat that emerges from these
[methodological] considerations is that appellate investigations in the employment
discrimination area reflect a selection bias.”).
188
For example, the U.S. Courts of Appeals publish opinions only selectively, and
the circuits follow different rules regarding unpublished opinions. Ruth Colker, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99,
104–05 (1999) (noting the problems of statistical representation inherent in
empirical analysis of appellate court decisions); see also Colker, supra note 187, at
244–47.
189
The few exceptions include settlement agreements for class actions, claims
filed by a governmental plaintiff, such as the EEOC, and, in some states, claims
against a governmental defendant regarding public records. See Scott A. Moss,
Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 867, 869–70 & nn.3–17 (2007).
190
See Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13 at 931–44.
191
See Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13 at 931–44.
192
Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13 at 937.
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193

pretext instruction than a motivating factor instruction.
To be sure, that differing burdens of proof generate different
results does not by itself imply a problem. If legitimate rationales
support different proof burdens, different results would not only be
acceptable, they would be desirable. In fact, as an economic matter,
194
burdens of proof should be constructed in civil litigation this way.
Regrettably, however, this is not the case. After Costa and prior to
Gross, there was no clear standard as to when courts would apply the
motivating factor instruction and not the pretext instruction. After
Gross and Nassar, this problem remains in Title VII cases. POWADA
endeavors to provide equity for all protected classes by overturning
Gross and Nassar and allowing employees to select their preferred
195
method of proof in all discrimination cases.
While the statute
solves the problem of judicial (i.e., judges deciding when to allow the
motivating factor instruction or not) and statutory inconsistency
(treating age and disability differently than the other five protected
classes), there are three problems that the statute either does not
address or exacerbates.
First, should jurors unwittingly award
thousands of dollars in costs and fees to plaintiffs? Second, should
employers that render legitimate business decisions be penalized for
perceived illegitimate motivations? In other words, should Congress
penalize an employer if a jury infers (correctly or incorrectly)
motivation based on the decision maker’s race, sex, or religion but
agrees that the decision would have been made regardless of the
protected class? The third question—and the focus of this study—
involves whether retaliation should be included with other protected
classes when it comes to the motivating factor jury instructions.
Below, we posit that it should not.
A. Experimental Mock Jury Studies
We selected an experimental research design, specifically, a
mock jury experiment, as the best available methodology to address
the empirical challenges noted above. Although mock jury studies
are increasingly common in legal scholarship, the method warrants a
brief discussion. Mock jury studies endeavor to leverage the benefits
193

Id. at 937–38 (“Both [the motivating factor without the affirmative defense
option and the full motivating factor option] . . . are less desirable than the pretext
jury instruction for employers.”).
194
Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An
Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 418–22 (1997).
195
Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721, 111th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2009).
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of experimental research (such as manipulating key variables) while
196
minimizing problems of ecological validity. When reviewing mock
jury research, researchers have noted a variety of issues in which
mock jury experiments were instrumental—juror characteristics, the
effects of prejudicial pretrial news coverage, the use of impermissible
information, jurors’ ability to understand standards of proof and
instructions on the law, and deliberation phenomena, to name a
197
few.
Two experiments are described below detail to illustrate the
process.
Mock jury experiments have assisted research efforts to
investigate the role of race in jury decision making. A 2001 mock jury
experiment, for example, examined the effect of racially-charged
198
facts on white jurors’ biases in a criminal case.
Researchers
randomly distributed packets containing a trial summary, judicial
instructions, and a questionnaire to white participants in an airport
199
waiting area. Half of the summaries involved a white defendant and
200
half involved a black defendant. Additionally, while half contained
racially charged factual circumstances, racial tension was absent in
201
the other half.
Subjects rendered a verdict, recommended a
sentence, and rated the strength of the prosecution’s and
202
defendant’s cases. Statistical analyses illustrated that in race-neutral
cases, white jurors more readily display anti-black bias than in racially
196

See generally David De Cremer and Daan Van Knippenberg, How Do Leaders
Promote Cooperation? The Effects of Charisma and Procedural Fairness, 87 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 858 (2002); Robert J. MacCoun, Comparing Legal Factfinders: Real and Mock,
Amateur and Professional, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511 (2005); Shari Seidman Diamond,
Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561 (1997).
197
See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages:
Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301 (1999);
Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make
Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 9–44 (1997). Mock jury studies have also been
used to lend insight on important questions of how well decision makers understand
certain kinds of evidence commonly presented to jurors. See, e.g., D.H. Kaye and
Jonathan J. Koehler, Can Jurors Understand Probabilistic Evidence?, 154 J. ROYAL STAT.
SOC’Y 75 (1991).
198
Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of
Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
201, 214–26 (2001).
199
Id. at 216.
200
Id.
201
In the racially-charged version, the defendant was one of only two of his race
on a basketball team and had suffered racial remarks and unfair criticism by
teammates. The race-neutral version did not mention racial tension. However, all
summaries identified the defendant’s race in a demographic information section. Id.
202
Id. at 217.
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203

charged cases. The authors hypothesized that the presence of race
204
issues prompts jurors to conceal prejudice.
Researchers have also frequently turned to mock jury
experiments to investigate jurors’ ability to disregard inadmissible
205
evidence.
A seminal mock jury study, part of the University of
Chicago jury project, examined damage awards for a fictional
206
automobile accident case. Three groups of participants listened to
207
In the first group’s recording, the
tape-recorded mock trials.
defendant revealed he had no insurance, to no objection; in the
second group, the defendant revealed he had insurance, to no
objection; and in the third, the defendant revealed he had insurance,
counsel objected, and the court directed the jury to disregard the
208
statement. The average awards were $33,000, $37,000, and $46,000
209
The study concluded that
for the three groups, respectively.
attention drawn to the defendant’s insurance coverage sensitized
210
jurors to that fact and contributed to higher damage awards.
Mock jury experiments provide important advantages over posttrial jury interviews and trial outcome quantitative analyses. Notably,
the ability to change one variable at a time permits researchers to
gain purchase on mechanisms and relations among variables that are
211
often otherwise unobservable using other empirical methodologies.
Nonetheless, the experimental approach is not without important
limitations, mostly with the consequence of reduced external validity.
Standard problems include the following: (1) mock jurors are often
students rather than a more representative general population
sample; (2) facts are presented in writing or by video or audio
recording rather than through a live trial; (3) verdicts lack real-world
consequences; and, most often, (4) the absence of group (jury-room)
203

Id. at 220.
Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 198, at 220.
205
See Koehler and Kaye, supra note 197.
206
See Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744,
753 (1959).
207
Id.
208
Id. at 753–54.
209
Id. at 754.
210
Id. But see Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Damage Anchors on Real Juries, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 148 (2011) (suggesting that jurors are less sensitive to
plaintiffs’ damage award demands, in spite of the theoretically plausible existence of
strong anchoring effects).
211
Seidman Diamond et al, supra note 197, at 302–03; Samuel R. Sommers and
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and Juries? A Review of
Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1002–03 (2003).
204
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deliberation.
The degree to which student mock jurors attenuate external
validity is unclear. For example, studies examining the use of
students have found “little or no difference in . . . verdicts by student
213
and adult jury-eligible respondents for the same cases.”
A metaanalysis of twenty years of jury simulations found no conclusive
214
differences between student and non-student participants.
Where
infrequent differences arose, students demonstrated a slight
preference against criminal conviction and for defendant civil
215
liability.
Although the absence of real-world consequences in mock jury
experiments certainly limits external validity, results from studies of
216
how actual and mock-jury study findings differ are mixed.
For
example, of the five studies discussed in the Bornstein and McCabe
Article, one study found the absence of real-life consequences
increased conviction rates, another study found the opposite effect,
217
and the remaining three found no main effect at all.
Regardless,
difficulties associated with studying—let alone manipulating—jury
behavior make access to such data not readily feasible.
The absence of group deliberations, however, perhaps poses the
greatest threat. Fieldwork examined by a 2001 meta-analysis suggests
that in 10 percent of trials, a jury majority will change post218
deliberation.
Deliberation comes at a cost, however—it requires
more time and reduces sample size to one verdict for every six, eight,
or twelve subjects, resulting in greater expense per unit of analysis.
We tried to mitigate this problem by first having groups of six
deliberate as one body. After deliberations were complete, the
students then filled out the special jury verdict sheet on their own.
Altogether, limitations notwithstanding, mock jury experiments are a
necessary first step in designing more expensive and elaborate studies

212

See Saks, supra note 197, at 7.
Robert J. MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, 244 SCI. 1046,
1046 (1989).
214
Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still
Out?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75, 77–80 (1999).
215
Id. at 80.
216
Brian H. Bornstein & Sean G. McCabe, Jurors of the Absurd? The Role of
Consequentiality in Jury Simulation Research, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 443, 452 (2005).
217
Id. at 453 Table 1.
218
Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 701 (2001).
213
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219

that examine deliberation.

B. Jury Instruction Studies in the Employment Discrimination Context
In an effort to enhance external validity, our experiment used
case statements constructed (and used) by experienced employment
220
discrimination specialists at a leading New York City law firm.
Before describing our experimental design, we first describe the jury
instructions and special verdict sheets used in our study.
One problem with studying jury instructions is the variation in
real-world jury instructions used by judges. In some jurisdictions,
judges are permitted to develop their own proprietary jury
instructions, as long as they accord with settled law. Judges typically
ask each party to draft proposed jury instructions and then choose
one of the two proposals or draft a third version themselves. Other
jurisdictions have established model jury instructions that are
221
routinely deployed.
These jury instructions are accompanied by
“special jury verdict sheets.”
This study exploits sample
discrimination jury instructions and special verdict sheets that the
Northern District of Illinois made publicly available. Appendix A
contains the jury instructions and special verdict sheets used in this
222
study.

219

Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 198, at 224.
Founded in 1875, Proskauer, Rose LLP is a full service law firm with offices in
New York, New Jersey, Florida, Los Angeles, Boston, Chicago, New Orleans,
Washington D.C., and throughout the world. Proskauer,
About Us, http://www.proskauer.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 1. 2014).
221
See, e.g., Lopez v. Mendez, 432 F.3d 829, 835 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding no error
in the trial court’s determination that an applicable Arkansas Model Jury Instruction
stated Arkansas law correctly); Gatlin v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 481 S.W. 2d 338,
340–41 (Ark. 1972) (finding error where the trial court substituted its own
instruction for an applicable Arkansas Model Jury Instruction without stating the
basis for refusal); Irwin v. Omar Bakeries, Inc., 198 N.E.2d 700, 704–05 (Ill. App. Ct.
1964) (finding no error where the trial court did not use a specific Illinois Pattern
Jury Instruction that the court determined was inapplicable); Means v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 550 S.W. 2d 780, 786–87 (Mo. 1977) (finding no error where the
trial court modified the Missouri Approved Jury Instruction to apply it to the case
facts); Anderson v. Welsh, 527 P.2d 1079, 1086–87 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) (finding
non-prejudicial error where the trial court gave not only the applicable Uniform Jury
Instruction but additional inapplicable Uniform Jury Instructions).
222
FED. CIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIR., § 3.01 & cmt. c (Comm. on
Pattern Civ. Jury Instructions of the Seventh Cir., Draft, Oct. 2004), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20050120184720/www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Rules
/pjury_civil_draft.pdf.
220
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C. Experimental Evidence on Employer Retaliation
While we previously argued, and currently argue, that disability
and age should fall under the same standard as sex, race, color,
223
national origin, and religion,
we contend that retaliation is
different. Since most discrimination cases are discharge cases, there
is a strong argument that the protected class is irrelevant, or at least
less relevant. We begin from the truism that a company may not
discharge an employee who is a member of a protected class (e.g.,
gender, race, or religious group) without having hired this employee
in the first instance. So, before any additional facts are added, on its
face, it is difficult to explain why an employer would offer
employment to an employee in a protected class at some expense,
risking liability, and then take an adverse employment action against
that person with animus against him because of the protected class
some time later. At least, one may say that the logic may seem
inconsistent and the explanation for the adverse employment action
may not be obvious on its face. Such logic, of course, has critical
limitations. For example, the actors making hiring decisions are not
necessarily those responsible for the allegedly adverse employment
actions, or certain protected groups could be judged under different
standards. Still, absent evidence to support the plaintiff, it seems
unlikely that juries will more often than not presume that the
protected class “motivated” the employer. Conversely, we propose
that a person terminated or denied a promotion after making a
complaint of discrimination is in a very different position. Retaliation
plaintiffs’ status changes during employment. By engaging in
protected expression, such plaintiffs land in a protected class they
were not in upon hire. Thus, the jury is not perplexed as to how the
employer hired a person in a protected class and subsequently
became, for example, a sexist, racist, or ageist. In such contexts, we
suggest the possibility that juries will likely find that retaliation
motivated the employer. Results from our study comport with this
suggestion.
We replicated our 2010 study with a few key changes. Instead of
a national origin case, we used a retaliation case. We altered the
name of the plaintiff so that it sounded more similar (or familiar) to
the decision makers (employer). We also slightly modified the fact
pattern. In the new fact pattern, the plaintiff, a senior employee, was
approached by coworkers who believed that their supervisor sexually
223

See generally Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13.
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harassed women and discriminated against African Americans. The
plaintiff engaged in a protected expression by telling the supervisor
that he sexually harassed and discriminated against employees. We
also altered the jury instructions and the special jury verdict sheet to
reflect the employee’s retaliation claim.
To enhance replicability, our current study otherwise matches
our past study. In both studies, the subjects were Cornell University
undergraduate students, with the vast majority enrolled in a
management program. The statement of the case was delivered by
associates from a New York City law firm, and the subjects reviewed
the materials under conditions similar to the prior study. This time,
we did not vary the kind of jury instructions that the subjects
reviewed. Instead, all participants received the motivating-factor
instruction. Some key results differed between the two studies.
These are discussed below.
D. The Experiment
Senior litigation associates from Proskauer Rose’s New York City
office developed a standard employment discrimination scenario.
Specifically, in the scenario, a plaintiff alleged his employer retaliated
against him by denying him a promotion for complaining about
sexual harassment and racial discrimination in the workplace.
Cornell University undergraduate students (N=128) served as mock
224
jurors.
All subjects received an identical presentation of the case
statement. At two different times, participants watched the case
statements on large video screens in a lecture hall. We showed the
plaintiff’s statement first and then immediately showed the
defendant’s statement. Subjects were then provided a motivating
factor jury instruction.
After hearing the jury instructions,
participants were randomly assigned into groups of six and provided
special jury verdict sheets. They were given twenty minutes to
deliberate. After concluding their deliberations, subjects were asked
225
to fill out individual verdict forms.
Table 1 presents salient respondent demographics. Just over
one-half were female and most were white. The majority of nonwhite students were Asian. Moreover, just over one-half of the
224

Most of the participating students were attending Cornell’s School of Hotel
Administration.
225
To minimize underreporting and esteem-based influences, the experiment
was conducted in a large auditorium classroom. Special jury verdict forms were
completed anonymously.
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subjects came from households in which reported annual family
income exceeded $250,000. White subjects from homes with the
highest annual family income (in excess of $250,000) comprised 35.5
percent of the sample.
TABLE 1: RESPONDENTS’ SUMMARY STATISTICS
%
All Respondents

(N)
128
94

Gender:
Female

54.3

Race/Ethnicity:
White
Non-White
Hispanic
Mixed
Asian
Black
[other]

68.5
31.5
1.1
9.8
18.5
1.1
1.1

Annual Family Income:
$50K or less
$51K—$100K
$101K—$150K
$151K—$200K
$201K—$250K
More than $250K

5.4
9.7
9.7
14.0
10.8
50.5

Prior work experience

98.9

Interaction:
White-highest income

35.5

92

93

93
93

E. Results and Discussion
Table 2 reports the main findings. More than 59 percent of the
jurors agreed that the plaintiff (employee) successfully established
that retaliation from plaintiff’s complaints about sexual and racial
discrimination in the workplace was a motivating factor in the
employer’s failure to promote plaintiff resulted from. The difference
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between jurors’ “yes” and “no” votes is statistically significant.
Moreover, while 59 percent of the jurors found that retaliation
motivated the employer, results in Tables 2 and 4 demonstrate that
only 9.3 percent (12/128) of jurors found that the employer failed to
prove that it would have made the same decision regardless of
retaliation. Overall, our results, while merely descriptive and
experimental, illustrate how the two-question motivating-factor
instruction results in the majority of jurors awarding the plaintiff
attorneys’ fees and litigation costs even when the jurors believe that
the plaintiff did not deserve damages.
To assess whether jurors’ background characteristics inform
jurors’ assessment of the plaintiff’s retaliation claim, additional
analyses considered the potential influence of gender, race, and
family income. While assessing various juror sub-pools reduces
statistical power, it is still worth noting that none of these listed
individual characteristics are statistically significantly associated with
juror decision rendering.
TABLE 2: SUBJECTS’ JURY VERDICTS: PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED
RETALIATION CLAIM

Total
Gender:
Female
Male
Race:
White
Non-white
Family Income:
Less than $250K
More than $250K
Interactions:
White, highest income
Non-white, highest income

Yes

No

Sig.

(N)

76

52

*

128

23
26

28
17

51
43

30
17

33
12

63
29

24
24

22
23

46
47

16
32

17
28

33
60

NOTE: * p < 0.05.

226

P= 0.041 (two-tailed binominal distribution test).
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To provide additional context, we compare our main result in
Table 2 with results from prior research on a similar—though
distinct—issue. Over a two-year period in the early 2000’s we ran a
similar experiment drawing from the same pool of subjects
(undergraduate students attending Cornell University) that focused
on an employee’s claim that national origin discrimination was the
227
reason that his employer failed to promote the plaintiff.
In that
study, jurors were provided with either: (1) the full motivating-factor
jury instruction and special jury verdict sheet; (2) the motivatingfactor instruction without the second question (i.e. the employer’s
affirmative defense that it would have made the same decision
regardless of national origin); or (3) the so-called “but-for” jury
instruction and special verdict jury sheet. The purpose of that study
was to determine whether the different instructions affected
outcomes. We found that there was no statistically significant
difference between the full motivating-factor instruction and the
“but-for” instruction when it came to the ultimate question of
whether the employee was entitled to damages. We did find,
however, that there was a significant difference between the first
question in the motivating-factor special jury verdict sheet and the
one and only “but for” question. Because answering the first question
in the motivating-factor scheme results in costs and fees, the
difference was not only statistically different, but it also carried
important practical legal consequences.
In our current study, we explored whether simply changing the
employment discrimination claim from national origin to retaliation
would influence juror results. By replicating the general nature of
the factual case and, insofar as our experimental juror population
remained essentially constant, we sought to control the influence of
salient background variables. On the ultimate question of whether
the employee was entitled to damages, we did not expect a major
change in how jurors ruled. Results on the employee damages
question generally comported with our expectations. While the
percentage of jurors awarding full damages to the complaining
employee increased (from 6.3 percent to 9.3 percent), such an
increase strikes us as de minimus (though suggestive). Insofar as we
feel the underlying nature of employee retaliation claims
fundamentally differs from that of national origin claims in the
employment discrimination litigation context, we expected to find
different juror outcomes. Results from our two studies comport with
227

See Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 11.

SHERWYN HEISE (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

4/2/2014 12:11 PM

EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE AND RETALIATION

497

these expectations.
Table 3 presents core results from the two separate studies and
illustrates the important difference regarding how the mock jurors
answered the motivating-factor question. In 2010, just over 40
percent of the mock jurors concluded that the employee successfully
established that discrimination based on national origin motivated
the employer. In 2013, however, almost 60 percent of the mock
jurors concluded that the employee established that retaliation
motivated the employer. While it is true that a few years separate
these two experiments, there is little, if any, reason to expect that
students drawn from the same underlying population would behave
differently in the two experiments. We are unaware of any material
changes in terms of the composition of Cornell University
undergraduates over these years. Rather, differences in the nature of
the employment discrimination claims (national origin versus
retaliation) more likely account for the increase (from 40.1 percent
to 59.4 percent) in jurors concluding that the complaining employee
successfully established its legal claim.
TABLE 3: SUBJECTS’ JURY VERDICTS: PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
(1)
National Origin
(2010)

(2)
Retaliation
(2013)

Yes
No

40.1%
59.9%

59.4%
40.6%

(N)

142

128

NOTES: Values in column 1 derive from our 2010 study of jury instructions’
influence in a national origin employment discrimination claim. Values in column 2
come from row 1 in Table 2, supra.
SOURCE: Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 11 (column 1).

For the fifty-two mock jurors who concluded that the plaintiff
failed to establish that retaliation was a motivating factor, their work
as a juror ended. The remaining seventy-six mock jurors, who
concluded that the plaintiff successfully established that retaliation
motivated the employer, proceeded on to question 2 on the juror
special verdict form. Question 2 asks whether the defendant
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(employer) successfully established that its decision not to promote
the employee was made independently of the employee’s sexual and
racial workplace harassment claims. As the results in Table 4 make
clear, over 84 percent of the jurors agreed with the employer’s
(defendant’s) claim that the employer would have made the same
decision regardless of retaliation. Similar to the results in question 1,
the difference between jurors’ “yes” and “no” votes in question 2 is
228
statistically significant.
Also, similar to the results in question 1,
none of the results involving demographic characteristics are
statistically significantly associated with juror decision making.
TABLE 4: SUBJECTS’ JURY VERDICTS (PART 2): DEFENDANT
ESTABLISHED NO PLAINTIFF PROMOTION DESPITE PLAINTIFF
DISCRIMINATION CLAIM

Total
Gender:
Female
Male
Race:
White
Non-white
Family Income:
Less than $250K
More than $250K
Interactions:
White, highest income
Non-white, highest income

Yes

No

Sig.

(N)

64

12

**

76

17
24

6
2

23
26

27
12

3
5

30
17

19
21

5
3

24
24

15
25

1
7

16
32

NOTE: ** p < 0.01.

Insofar as all but one of our respondents already benefit from
employment experience and all are enrolled in a management
preparation program, our sample drawn from a population of
undergraduate students might represent a more traditional
management perspective. Moreover, while the experienced New
York City employment lawyers who drafted the factual scenario used
in both of our studies attempted to make the case a very close call
legally, they had represented the employer in the actual case and thus
228

P < 0.001 (two-tailed binominal distribution test).
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had developed and lived with the employer’s strategies and theories
of the case. Thus, it is likely that both the sample of mock jurors and
the source of the factual scenario are predisposed to side with
management. Despite a likely net bias favoring the employer,
however, almost 60 percent of our jurors awarded either full damages
or costs and fees to the employee.
These results greatly affect the three concerns articulated above.
First, employers are penalized for their thoughts, not their actions.
An employer who would not have promoted the hypothetical plaintiff
regardless of his complaints is still found liable for costs and fees.
Congress determined that even being motivated by race, sex, color,
religion, or national origin is unlawful and worthy of declaratory
judgment as well as costs and fees. It seems that Congress wants to
create a world in which these protected characteristics do not even
cross an employer’s mind. This is a laudable goal and we agree that
the world would be a better place if this lack of prejudice became
standard behavior. We contend this is not the case in retaliation. As
noted above, retaliation is a biologically engrained human response
229
to negative stimuli.
Is it reasonable to suggest that humans have
evolved to the point where a plaintiff’s good faith and reasonable, but
false, accusation of reprehensible behavior (like sexual harassment or
racial discrimination) will not factor into a decision maker’s motives?
Is this a goal that we should pursue so that those who do not let such
actions be a but for cause, but do let it play a role in a decision, are
guilty of discrimination and need to suffer financial and social
consequences?
Second, the jury does not know that checking the box for
motivating factor results in costs and fees. In fact, several students
remarked that “yes / yes = no.” In terms of damages, it does. In
discrimination cases, however, costs and fees can greatly exceed back
pay. Thus, this kind of special jury verdict sheet can functionally
mislead jurors. This is particularly problematic given the likely way in
which jurors endogenously consider damage awards with their
determination of the merits of a case. For instance, Hans and Reyna
posit that jurors first make a categorical “gist judgment” that money
damages are warranted and then make an ordinal gist judgment
230
ranking the damages deserved as low, medium, or high.
If this is
229

See supra Part III.C.
Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, To Dollars from Sense: Qualitative to
Quantitative Translation in Jury Damage Awards, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120, 120
(2011).
230
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the case, the findings in this study are even more problematic.
This issue is not limited to retaliation, but our third concern
shows that retaliation exacerbates the problem. In the 2010 study, 40
percent of the mock jurors found that national origin motivated the
232
employer. With an almost identical fact pattern, 60 percent of the
mock jurors in the instant study found retaliation motivated the
employer. In addition, fifty percent of the mock jurors found that
retaliation motivated the employer, but it would have made the same
decision regardless. In our 2010 study, only 34 percent of the jurors
233
ruled the same way. The stark contrast in these numbers supports
our contention that retaliation differs in important ways from other
protected employee classes. The fact that our sample of mock jurors
likely skews in a direction that favors employers only deepens the
concerns. If POWADA passes, it seems highly likely that the vast
majority of retaliation plaintiffs will successfully obtain at the very least
cost and fees. If so, this should stimulate employee retaliation claims,
particularly from employees uneasy with their job security. By
pushing retaliation claims, strategic employees can exploit employers’
aversion to increased legal uncertainty and exposure. Moreover, this
might also prompt judges to look more favorably on employers’
summary judgment motions owing to fears—real or perceived—
about cost and fees awards. Judges may also increasingly deny costs
and fees despite jury findings. In reality, employers faced with
retaliation claims will settle a greater percentage of cases and for
higher amounts. These settlements will, in turn, fuel further
litigation. To dampen the likely tide of retaliation claims, employers
could reduce avenues to complain of discrimination as such
complaints will be too costly or seek to create a more homogeneous
workforce in which complaints will carry less weight.
Fewer
complaints and an incentive to avoid diversity will perpetuate
discrimination. This is an admittedly pessimistic and unfortunate
vicious cycle.

231

Another recent article suggests that this result is problematic because it belies
the extent to which fact-finders try to establish “the truth, rather than a statistical
surrogate of the truth, while securing the appropriate allocation of the risk of error.”
Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 ARIZ. L.
REV. 557, 557–602 (2013).
232
Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13, at 934 Table 1.
233
Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 13, at 934 & Tables 1 & 2.
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V. CONCLUSION: START MAKING SENSE
We suggest three fixes to the challenges outlined above flowing
from POWADA’s proposal to extend the mixed-motive jury
instruction in employer retaliation discrimination cases. First,
Congress could return to the Price Waterhouse holding and not award
costs and fees for motivations that do not pass the “but for” causation
test. This is a value judgment of whether motivations that do not
really impact employers’ decisions should be unlawful. If so, should
the plaintiffs’ lawyers be compensated for bringing cases in which
protected categories form non-determinative motivations in adverse
employment actions? Second, juries should be informed that
checking the motivating factor box will lead to awarding plaintiffs
costs and fees. At least then juror will be aware of the consequences
of their decisions. There is an important policy concern associated
with this response. Should decision makers be aware of the monetary
consequences of fact finding, or is it better to let them blindly assess
facts and leave to judges the consequences of those findings? The
third option is to simply accept that retaliation is equal, but that some
kinds of employment claims are less equal than others and to exclude
it from POWADA.
While we contend that either of the first two steps would resolve
problems, neither is necessary. Smoking gun evidence supporting
discrimination claims is less common now. It is difficult to prove
discrimination, and thus, the motivating factor scheme provides
plaintiffs a reasonable chance to prevail. This is not the case with
retaliation, however. The motivating-factor scheme will unduly
increase the prospects for costs and fees awarded employees. Even
now, employment lawyers warn employers not to try to “save” a
234
struggling employee.
Once the employee receives a performance
improvement plan, the employee knows it is time to file a claim and
235
Fear-based
buy six to eight months of fear-based employment.
employment occurs when the employer fears the costs of termination
more than the costs of an unproductive or disruptive employee.
From a social standpoint, this not a positive development—people
often need coaching to perform in a job. POWADA would further
discourage employers to help poor performing employees. The
potential negatives outweigh the benefit of penalizing employers for
retaliatory impulses.
234

Gregg A. Gilman, Partner, Davis & Gilbert LLP, Remarks at 6th Annual HR in
Hospitality Conference, Las Vegas, Nevada (Mar. 2013).
235
Id.
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We propose that the categories of age and disability be treated
like all other protected classes. There is neither a statutory nor
logical basis to distinguish age and disability from other traditionally
protected employee classes. In contrast, employer retaliation is
different and, as such, should be treated differently by employment
discrimination doctrine.
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Appendix A
Special Verdict Sheet:
________________________________X
Dennis Ferguson,
Plaintiff,
– against –
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
ROCHESTER CHRONICLE, INC.,
Defendant.
_________________________________X
1. Did plaintiff Dennis Ferguson establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that retaliation for his complaints of sexual harassment
and racial discrimination was a motivating factor in the decision by
defendant, Rochester Chronicle, Inc., not to offer him a promotion
in December 2009?
Yes ____No ____
You should answer the next question only if you answered “yes”
to Question 1. If you answered Question 1 “no,” you should not
answer any further questions but sign this special verdict form on the
last page and return the form to the clerk.
2. Did defendant establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant would have treated plaintiff the same way even if
retaliation for plaintiff’s complaints of sexual harassment and racial
discrimination had not played any role in the employment decision?
Yes ____No ____
If you answered “yes” to Question 2, sign the special verdict form on
the last page. If you answered “no” to Question 2, plaintiff is entitled
to recover back pay damages. The parties have stipulated that the
total amount of back pay to be awarded to plaintiff is $75,000. Check
the box below to signify that the plaintiff is entitled to damages of
$75,000 and then sign the special verdict form.
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Plaintiff is entitled to back pay in the amount of $75,000. _____
SIGNED:

Please answer the following questions:
1. Gender: M F
2. Race / National Origin:
3. Have you worked for an employer?: Y N
4. Family Income:
a. Under $50,000
b. $51,000-$100,000
c. $101,000-150,000
d. $151-$200,000
e. $201,000-$250,000
f.

Over $250,000

